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Abstract
In this essay, I endeavor to demonstrate that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem has an
implication about epistemic blindspots. “Blindspot” is a term used by Roy Sorensen, and is defined
as a true but unknowable proposition. It is inspired by the notion of a visual blind spot, which is
an area of our vision that we are blind to due to the optic nerve, and is filled in by the brain using
surrounding information.
This essay aims to introduce the notion of “Gödel blindspots,” which are propositions that
are true yet unknown due to the diagonal lemma. Gödel blindspots only occur in theories of
arithmetic in which “knowledge” is a predicate, which is necessary to properly utilize the diagonal
lemma. Nonetheless, blindspots of a similar nature, that being self-referential sentences that deny
a predicate of themselves, exist in natural language, such as in sentences such as “Necessarily, I
am not known.” These types of sentences provide a strong case against the K Principle, the primary
premise used in Fitch’s paradox of knowability to derive the conclusion of epistemic trivialism.
Implications of Fitch’s paradox are discussed in-depth.
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Introduction
Epistemic blindspots are true but unknowable propositions. They are inspired by the notion
of a visual blind spot, which is an area of our vision that we cannot see and is “filled in” using
surrounding visual information. While we are not usually aware of our visual blind spots, it is
possible to witness an item in the visual field disappear if it falls into the blind spot. Likewise,
while we are not often aware of epistemic blindspots, we may notice individual propositions that
that are unknowable if we know where to look. Sorensen, in his book Blindspots, gives an exercise
to witness one’s visual blind spot. I have recreated it here. Hold the page about 18 inches away
from your eyes. Close your left eye, then look at the left dot. You will see the right dot disappear
on the paper.
⬤

⬤

Much like visual blind spots, where you can find the other dot by shifting your gaze or looking
from a different position, many blindspots can be “spotted” by being analyzed at a different time,
by being analyzed by a different person, or by using different means. There are many types of
blindspots, such as blindspots about belief (such as the sentence-form, “𝑃 but I don’t believe 𝑃,”
which cannot be rationally believed by the one who utters it), blindspots about knowledge (such
as the sentence-form “𝑃 but I don’t know 𝑃,” which cannot be known by the one who utters it),
and absolute variants of each of these (such as “𝑃 but no one knows that 𝑃,” which cannot be
known by anybody).
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is a theorem in metamathematics that asserts the
existence of consistent but unprovable propositions in the language of arithmetic. It is done by
virtue of a diagonal argument. First, one introduces a Gödel numbering, which is an injection from
the sentences of arithmetic to numerals, or concatenations of numerals. One then proves that a
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function exists that computes the diagonalization of a sentence of arithmetic. You can then use that
to prove the existence of certain self-referential sentences. This proves that arithmetic isn’t
decidable. Then, by proving that all axiomatizable and complete theories are decidable, you prove
that arithmetic is incomplete (i.e. that there exist consistent yet unprovable propositions).
Arguably, the most crucial step in this proof is proving the existence of certain self-referential
sentences. This section of the proof is deemed the “diagonal lemma,” or less commonly, the “fixedpoint lemma,” which will be what we will mostly concern ourselves with.
This essay aims to expand the notion of “blindspots” into the realm of formal epistemology.
Using Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and referring to “knowledge” as a formula
represented in arithmetic, I will prove that a different kind of blindspot exists—a blindspot that
doesn’t necessarily generate “unknowable” propositions, but blindspots in the sense that there are
necessarily unknown propositions. I say “blindspot” in the □ ∃ sense, rather than the ∃ □ sense
(Humberstone 2019), such that these blindspots necessarily exist, not that there exist sentences
which are necessarily blindspots. I will first augment Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, by
following it up until the diagonal lemma, then instantiating the quantified fixed-point sentence
with the negation of a factive knowledge predicate. Next, I will examine Fitch’s paradox of
knowability and analyze the K Principle (the central premise of the paradox) through the lens of
knowledge represented in arithmetic. Then, I will identify some self-referential blindspots in
natural language, as inspired by the central theorem of the paper. Finally, I will revisit Fitch’s
paradox one final time after examining self-referential blindspots that assert that they are not
known.
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The Proof Expressed
The primary proof hinges on proving Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem up to the
diagonal lemma, applying the diagonal lemma to demonstrate that there exists a sentence 𝜙 such
that 𝜙 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝜙⌝) where 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 can have several properties, but must include factivity:
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙. Finally, through a simple derivation in first-order logic, I show that there
necessarily exists a 𝜙 such that 𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝). The proof up through the diagonal lemma
will be adapted from Boolos and Jeffrey. The intention behind restating the proof here is so that
the reader is familiar with all of the premises and context behind the final result, as to avoid
misapplication of this result in formal epistemology.
Preliminary Material
The most important thing to understand before proving the diagonal lemma is to have an
understanding of Gödel numberings. Gödel numberings are a way of assigning a unique number
to each sentence of arithmetic. In other words, we create an injection of the sentences of arithmetic
onto the natural numbers (each natural number included in the mapping is associated with at most
one sentence of arithmetic). The mapping is from the following table of symbols:

(
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To the corresponding numbers in the following table:
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1
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3
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…
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.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

As you can see, each symbol is assigned a unique natural number. We can look at a number
on the bottom table and identify which symbol it represents. For instance, the number 399 can be
observed to represent the symbol “¬”. Next, we shall assign a couple of symbols of logic to
symbols of arithmetic. Boolos and Jeffrey call these “‘conventions’ about the identity of certain
symbols.” The assignments are as follows:
𝑥0 = 𝑥
𝑥1 = 𝑦
𝑓00 = 0
𝑓01 = 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑓02 = +
𝑓12 = ⋅
𝐴20 = =
Therefore, the Gödel number of 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐 is 68, and the Gödel number of ⋅ is 6889.
Recall that we said earlier that we were creating an injection of all sentences of arithmetic
to the natural numbers. So far, we have only created an injection of the symbols of arithmetic to
the naturals. So, let’s extend our system to include all sentences, and not just individual symbols.
To do that, we rely on the strategy by which we’ve defined our mapping so far. The way in which
we defined the mapping allows us to simply define the Gödel number of a sentence of arithmetic
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as

the

concatenation

𝑠0 + 𝑠0 = 𝑠𝑠0

first

of

all

of

becomes

the

symbols’

Gödel

𝐴20 𝑓02 𝑓01 𝑓00 𝑓01 𝑓00 𝑓01 𝑓01 𝑓00 ,

numbers.
which

An
then

example:
becomes

788688668866886886.
Finally, we will discuss the diagonalization of a sentence. A quick note about syntax: if the
Gödel number of an expression 𝜙 is 𝑛, then we will say that ⌜𝜙⌝ = 𝐧 where 𝐧 is a series of
symbols in the language. With that said, the diagonalization of an expression 𝜙 is the sentence:
(∃𝑥 )(𝑥 = ⌜𝜙⌝ & 𝜙(𝑥 ))
With all instances of “𝜙” replaced with 𝜙. This sentence effectively says that the expression 𝜙 is
true of its own Gödel number if 𝜙 contains only 𝑥 free.
With all of the preliminary material out of the way, we can finally get into the proof.
Lemma 1
Let 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 be a function that maps ⌜𝜙⌝ to the Gödel number of the diagonalization of 𝜙.
𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 is computable.
Proof: Let 𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑛) be defined as the least 𝑥 such that 0 < 𝑥 & 𝑛 < 10 𝑥 . The value of 𝑙𝑒𝑛
is the length of the numeric representation of a number 𝑛. For instance, 𝑙𝑒𝑛(45) = 2 and
𝑙𝑒𝑛(65535) = 5. 𝑙𝑒𝑛 is computable, since “less than” is computable, “the least such that” is
computable, and exponentiation is computable. Then, let 𝑚 ∗ 𝑛 = 𝑚 ⋅ 10𝑙𝑒𝑛(𝑛) + 𝑛. ∗ is
computable, since addition, multiplication, exponentiation, and 𝑙𝑒𝑛 are all computable. ∗ then
represents the concatenation of two numbers. For instance, 29 ∗ 7889 = 297889. Finally, let
𝑛𝑢𝑚 be defined recursively: 𝑛𝑢𝑚(0) = 6, and 𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑛 + 1) = 68 ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑛). 𝑛𝑢𝑚 then takes a
number as an argument and has as its value the Gödel number of the expansion of its argument.
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For instance, 𝑛𝑢𝑚(2) = 68686. 𝑛𝑢𝑚 is then computable, since recursion is computable and ∗ is
computable.
We can then define 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑛) to be 145217885 ∗ (𝑛𝑢𝑚(𝑛) ∗ (3 ∗ (𝑛 ∗ 2))). 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 is
computable, since ∗ is computable and 𝑛𝑢𝑚 is computable. Lemma 1 has been proven.
The diagonal lemma is what we are about to prove. It is essential to demonstrate the final
result. The diagonal lemma gives the existence of certain self-referential sentences of arithmetic—
sentences that are true if and only if some condition is true of that sentence. In fact, we’re going to
prove that these sentences exist for all such “conditions.” Without further ado, the diagonal lemma:
Lemma 2 (The Diagonal Lemma)
In any theory in which 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 is representable, for all formulas 𝜙 with one free variable
there exists a sentence 𝜓 such that:
𝜓 ↔ 𝜙(⌜𝜓⌝)
Proof: The first thing we’re going to do is create a predicate that represents 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 in this
theory. Representability is a property of an 𝑛-ary function that entails its ability to be defined as a
formula with 𝑛 + 1 free variables. The first 𝑛 free variables of this formula are just the arguments
of the given function, and the 𝑛 + 1th free variable of this formula is the result of applying the
function on the first 𝑛 arguments. This formula cannot merely be a predicate defined by
interpretation—it has to be “embedded” into the language, hence the emphasis on computability
in Lemma 1. For if a function is computable, it is representable in arithmetic. Representing 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔
in arithmetic yields a predicate that we will call 𝐷2 . Note that 𝐷2 is really a formula of the language
of arithmetic with two free variables, not a predicate defined in an interpretation, as
aforementioned. Define 𝐷2 as such: if 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑘 then 𝐷2 𝐧𝐤. In other words, if the Gödel
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number of the diagonalization of 𝑛 is 𝑘, then 𝐷2 𝐧𝐤. Remember than 𝐧’s relation to 𝑛 is such: if
the Gödel number of an expression 𝜙 is 𝑛, then ⌜𝜙⌝ = 𝐧.
Then we define a sentence 𝐹 (𝑥 ) = (∃𝑦)(𝐷2 𝑥𝑦 & 𝜙(𝑦)). Let 𝑛 be the Gödel number of 𝐹.
Then, let 𝜓 = (∃𝑥 ) (𝑥 = 𝐧 & (∃𝑦)(𝐷2 𝑥𝑦 & 𝜙(𝑦))). Recall that the diagonalization of a formula
is (∃𝑥 )(𝑥 = ⌜𝜙⌝ & 𝜙(𝑥 )) . Since the Gödel number of 𝐹 is 𝑛, ⌜𝐹⌝ = 𝐧. It’s easy then to see
that 𝜓 is the diagonalization of 𝐹. 𝜓 is logically equivalent to (∃𝑦)(𝐷2 𝐧𝑦 & 𝜙 (𝑦)). So, we have:
𝜓 ↔ (∃𝑦)(𝐷2 𝐧𝑦 & 𝜙 (𝑦))
Let 𝑘 be the Gödel number of 𝜓. So, ⌜𝜓⌝ = 𝐤. So, we have 𝐷 2 𝐧𝐤, from which:
(∀𝑦)(𝐷2 𝐧𝑦 ↔ 𝑦 = 𝐤)
Follows. Since 𝐷2 𝐧𝑦 is logically equivalent to 𝑦 = 𝐤, (∃𝑦)(𝐷2 𝐧𝑦 & 𝜙 (𝑦)) is logically equivalent
to (∃𝑦)(𝑦 = 𝐤 & 𝜙 (𝑦)). And since 𝜓 is logically equivalent to (∃𝑦)(𝐷2 𝐧𝑦 & 𝜙(𝑦)), we have:
𝜓 ↔ (∃𝑦)(𝐷2 𝐧𝑦 & 𝜙 (𝑦))
Which is logically equivalent to:
𝜓 ↔ 𝜙(𝐤)
And since the Gödel number of 𝜓 is 𝑘, we have (finally):
𝜓 ↔ 𝜙(⌜𝜓⌝)
Thus, proving the diagonal lemma.
Now that we have worked through Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem up through the
diagonal lemma, we are ready to present the main argument. This hinges on the diagonal lemma,
so the following demonstration only works for systems that are strong enough to represent 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔,
i.e. systems of arithmetic at least as strong as Robinson arithmetic. Anyway, here’s the main result:
Theorem 1
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In any formal system in which 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 is representable that contains a predicate 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 such
that 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝑃⌝) → 𝑃, there exists some sentence 𝜙 such that 𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝜙⌝).
Proof: By the diagonal lemma, we are able to demonstrate in any theory in which 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 is
representable that for any formula 𝜙, there exists sentence 𝜓 such that:
𝜓 ↔ 𝜙(⌜𝜓⌝)
Consider the predicate 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤, such that 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝑝⌝) → 𝑝. In essence, 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 encodes
some subset of the theorems of arithmetic. There may be some way of obtaining knowledge (and
there should be), so we may have some 𝜔 (⌜𝑝⌝) → 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝑝⌝) where 𝜔 is some sufficient
condition for knowledge. The specifics of 𝜔 are left unspecified until the section on Tarski’s
indefinability theorem, because it generally does not have an effect on the theorem.
By the diagonal lemma, there exists some sentence 𝜓 such that the following:
⊢ 𝜓 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜓⌝)
𝜓 would then “read” as “I am not known.” We can write this result as a first-order schema:
(∃𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝜙⌝))
Now consider the following deduction:
{}
{2}
{3}
{2, 3}
{2, 3}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

(∃𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))
𝜙 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝)
¬𝜙
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝)
𝜙
¬𝜙 → 𝜙
𝜙
¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝)
𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝)
(∃𝜙)(𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

Lemma 1
Premise
Premise
2, 3, Tautological inference
4, Definition of 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝)
3, 5, Conditionalization
6, Tautological inference
2, 7, Tautological inference
7, 8, Conjunctive addition
9, Existential generalization

{}

(11)

(∃𝜙)(𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

10, 𝐸𝑆 procedure
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This final sentence reads that there exists a sentence 𝜙 that is both true and not known. Q. E. D.
It’s worth noting that I didn’t add a dependency to 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙. I did this because I’m
assuming that 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙 is some axiom of the system, and hence, needs no dependency
line. If one desires to add the dependency line and conditionalize at the end, then you would simply
end up with a similar theorem on your last line:
(𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙) → (∃𝜙)(𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))
Which reads “If knowledge is factive, then there exists some sentence that is true and not known.”
So, there’s the proof explained. The key takeaway here is that 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 is some predicate
represented in a theory of arithmetic at least as strong as Robinson arithmetic, 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝑃⌝) → 𝑃,
and that there is some sentence 𝜙 that is true but 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) doesn’t hold, with that sentence
“saying” “I am not known.”
This is not to say that there is any particular blindspot that is necessarily unknowable.
Consider knowledge at two distinct points in time: 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝐴 represents the contents of one’s
knowledge at time 𝐴, and 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝐵 represents the contents of one’s knowledge at time 𝐵. It’s a
given that the contents of knowledge change over time as one learns and adds more to their
knowledge. So, we may have a proposition 𝜙 that is unknown due to the diagonal lemma at time
𝐴:
𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝐴 (⌜𝜙⌝)
Now consider the case that through some manner (the manner in which this occurs is not significant
to me) 𝜙 is learned at some point between time 𝐴 and time 𝐵. Then we will indeed have
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝐵 (⌜𝜙⌝)
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But the diagonal lemma necessitates that there must be some proposition that is unknown. So, at
time 𝐵, the set of Gödel blindspots changes to include 𝜓:
𝜓 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝐵 (⌜𝜓⌝)
So Gödel blindspots always exist, but they can change depending on the specific knowledge
predicate in question. There is not one specific object of knowledge that is necessarily unknown.
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Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem
One might have the worry that the prior result conflicts with Tarski’s indefinability
theorem. This section will be dedicated to resolving any concerns that the reader may have about
this. This section will be rather informal (a step back from the proof in the prior section), but should
still be enough to convince the reader that there is no conflict between theorem 1 and Tarski’s
indefinability theorem. At the end of the section, I will present an alternate proof of theorem 1 that
actually shows it to be a corollary of Tarski’s indefinability theorem.
An Informal Demonstration of Consistency
Tarski’s indefinability theorem states that “the set of Gödel numbers of sentences true in
𝑁 is not definable in arithmetic.” This can be rewritten as the second-order principle:
¬(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))
Theorem 1 is derivable from the following sentence:
(∃𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝜙⌝))
In effect, this states that if knowledge is factive, then there exists a sentence that is true if
and only if it’s not knowable. First, it’s worth noting that theorem 1 is also derivable from Tarski’s
theorem:
{}

(1)

{}

(2)

{}

(3)

{}
{}

¬(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))
(∀𝐹 )¬(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))

Tarski’s theorem
2, Universal specification

(4)

¬(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))
(∃𝜙)¬(𝜙 ↔ 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

(5)

(∃𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

4, Replacement

1, Quantifier exchange
3, Quantifier exchange

Now, obviously this doesn’t consider the factivity of knowledge. The very informal way I
will attempt to demonstrate consistency between theorem 1 and Tarski’s theorem is by first
considering knowledge that is both factive and logically omniscient (all true things are known),
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showing that that is inconsistent, then showing that the proof fails if knowledge is only factive
(with some other logically non-omniscient method for knowledge acquisition).
Consider the set of sentences containing Tarski’s theorem and a concept of knowledge that
holds knowledge as factive and that all truths are known. Now consider the following trivial
deduction:
{}
{}
{}
{}
{}

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

¬(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝑝 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))
(∀𝜙)(𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) ↔ 𝜙)
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜓⌝) ↔ 𝜓
𝜓 ↔ 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜓⌝)
(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

Tarski’s theorem
Definition of knowledge
2, Universal specification
3, Tautological inference
4, Universal generalization

{}
{}

(6)
(7)

(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))
⊥

5, Existential generalization
1, 6, ⊥ introduction

Now consider the sister deduction, without the assumption that all truths are known:
{}
{}
{}
{}
{}

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

¬(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))
(∀𝜙)(𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙)
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜓⌝) → 𝜓
𝜓 ← 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜓⌝)
(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ← 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

Tarski’s theorem
Definition of knowledge
2, Universal specification
3, Tautological inference
4, Universal generalization

{}

(6)

(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ← 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))

5, Existential generalization

Without the assumption that all truths are known, it lacks the strength to be in contradiction
to Tarski’s indefinability theorem. Intuitively, we can think of it like this: Tarski’s indefinability
theorem states that there is no Gödel representation of the theorems of arithmetic in arithmetic.
The reason this doesn’t cause issues for theorem 1 is because, without the assumption that all truths
are known, only a single direction of the mutual implication is met. Knowledge in this case embeds
a subset of the theorems of arithmetic. In fact, Tarski’s theorem can be thought of as another way
to demonstrate theorem 1, because knowledge, if represented in arithmetic, cannot be
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comprehensive of all truths, or else it will be in contradiction with Tarski’s theorem, since 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤
would then just be an alias for the truth predicate.
This alternate way to prove theorem 1 is as follows:
Theorem 1 (Proven Another Way)
In any formal system that represents 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 and a predicate 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 such that
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙, there exists some sentence 𝜙 such that 𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝).
Proof: Any formal system that represents 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 is strong enough to satisfy the conditions
for Tarski’s indefinability theorem. Tarski’s theorem states the following:
¬(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))
So, consider the following deduction:
{}
{2}
{3}
{2}
{3}
{2, 3}
{2, 3}

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

¬(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))
(∀𝜙)(𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙)
(∀𝜙)(𝜙 → 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))
𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝) → 𝜙
𝜙 → 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝)
𝜙 ↔ 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝)
(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

Tarski’s theorem
Knowledge factivity
Logical omniscience
2, Universal specification
3, Universal specification
4, 5, ↔ addition
6, Universal generalization

(∃𝐹 )(∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐹 (⌜𝜙⌝))

{2, 3} (8)
{2, 3} (9)
{2}
(10)

⊥
¬(∀𝜙)(𝜙 → 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

7, Existential generalization
1, 8, ⊥ introduction
3, 9, Reductio ad absurdum

{2}

(11)

(∃𝜙)¬(𝜙 → 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

10, Quantifier equivalence

{2}

(12)

(∃𝜙)(𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝))

11, Replacement

The result on line 12 is just theorem 1, this time with a more explicit reference to the premise that
knowledge is factive. So, theorem 1 is proven again, this time as a corollary to Tarski’s
indefinability theorem. It’s worth noting that in the RAA step on line 10, one could’ve instead
performed RAA on premise 2, rejecting factivity of knowledge. This is another result, and instead
says that, if all true things are known, then one also knows some falsities. This is another interesting
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result that may be used to argue against factivity, but in general, lots of contemporary
epistemologists seem to accept factivity, so in my opinion, it makes more sense to assert that there
always exist unknown sentences (Mitova 2018).
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Defining Gödel Blindspots
Now I would like to give an account of Gödel blindspots, the kind of blindspots
demonstrated to exist by theorem 1. Before we establish what Gödel blindspots are, we need a
generalized definition of epistemic blindspots, so that we can determine what the difference is.
Sorensen defines epistemic blindspots as “propositions that are inaccessible through weak
constraints,” where he defines the weakest “constraint” as being logic. I prefer a more descriptive
definition: true but unknowable propositions. That is, a 𝑝 such that 𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝. One set of such
propositions consists of propositions with form 𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 (under the assumption that knowledge
distributes over conjunction). The proof is as follows:
{1}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{}
{}
{}
{1}

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝
𝐾(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝)
𝐾𝑝 & 𝐾¬𝐾𝑝
𝐾¬𝐾𝑝
¬𝐾𝑝
𝐾𝑝
⊥
¬𝐾 (𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 )
□¬𝐾(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝)
¬◇𝐾 (𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 )
(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝) & ¬◇𝐾(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝)

Premise
Premise
2, Distribution
3, Conjunctive simplification
4, Factivity of knowledge
3, Conjunctive simplification
5, 6, ⊥ introduction
2, 7, Reductio ad absurdum
8, Necessitation
9, Modal equivalence
1, 10, Conjunctive addition

As an aside, the proof bears much resemblance to the deduction in Fitch’s paradox. As is
seen, the final proposition has the form 𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝, meaning 𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 is an epistemic blindspot.
How does this tie into theorem 1? As we demonstrated earlier, we proved something to the
effect of (∃𝜙)(𝜙 & ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝜙⌝)), which has a form similar to the modal sentence
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝). Here we’re going to depart from our general definition—as you can see, an
instantiation of the existential quantifier does not yield a sentence of the form 𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝. In fact,
that result is impossible. The reason is that necessitating our theorem yields □(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 ). As

21

Plantinga notes, you cannot get (∃𝑝)□(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝) from this sentence, which is necessary to get
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝 ), a sentence that expresses the existence of general blindspots. (Plantinga 1974).
So, Gödel blindspots are not a subset of epistemic blindspots. What are they, then? This is
the account I will give: Gödel blindspots are unknown (note: not unknowable) propositions that
are unknown due to the diagonal lemma. A particular Gödel blindspot can come to be known by
augmenting the knowledge representation to include that proposition (such as knowledge
acquisition over time), but the diagonal lemma says that there will always be some propositions
that are not known, no matter how much the knowledge representation is augmented to include
arithmetic truths (for, if there was such a representation of knowledge, it would come in conflict
with Tarski’s indefinability theorem). Those propositions that are not known due to the diagonal
lemma but are true are Gödel blindspots.
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Philosophical Reflections
In this section of the paper, I will start with a discussion of Fitch’s paradox of knowability,
which is a seemingly absurd deduction that stems from a claim of anti-realism to derive epistemic
trivialism (that all truths are known). I will give a defense of rejecting the premise of Fitch’s
paradox that all truths are knowable under the conditions that “knows that” is a predicate
represented in arithmetic, and that the term “truths” is restricted to “truths in arithmetic.” Then, we
will take a break from Fitch’s paradox to see how we can strengthen theorem 1 using some natural
language arguments, attempting to break away from these arithmetic restrictions and formalize
general blindspots (propositions that are true and unknowable, not merely unknown). Finally, we
will revisit Fitch’s paradox with our strengthened results, and reject the main premise of Fitch’s
paradox with an even stronger argument.
Gödel Blindspots and the K Principle
Fitch’s paradox of knowability is a deduction in alethic-epistemic logic that takes the
following premise known as the K Principle:
(∀𝑝)(𝑝 → ◇𝐾𝑝)
Stating that all truths are knowable, and derives the following conclusion:
(∀𝑝)(𝑝 → 𝐾𝑝 )
Stating that all truths are known. The only assumptions made about knowledge in the derivation
are that knowledge is factive (𝐾𝑝 → 𝑝) and that knowledge distributes over conjunction
(𝐾(𝑝 & 𝑞 ) → 𝐾𝑝 & 𝐾𝑞). As one of my professors says, “one man’s modus ponens is another man’s
modus tollens.” There are three general routes for responding to this result:
1. Reject the K Principle and embrace the existence of blindspots
2. Accept the conclusion, and embrace the notion that all truths are known
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3. Reject the deduction as a whole
At this point, I would like to give a defense of choosing 1 given certain assumptions. As
we’ve demonstrated through theorem 1, there exist propositions that are both true and not known.
If expressed modally, we get:
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 )
Which is in direct contradiction with the conclusion from Fitch’s paradox. However, we must not
forget the premises that made to get to this conclusion. Theorem 1 is a theorem about knowability
when represented in arithmetic—not knowability in univsersum. This leads us to the more general
question—is there a good reason for wanting to represent knowability in arithmetic? Since this
question is deserving of its own paper, I’ll leave my response brief: there are reasons for wanting
to represent knowledge as an arithmetic predicate, and I omit those reasons for the sake of brevity.
However, under the circumstance where we do want to represent knowledge in arithmetic, it’s
clear that we must accept theorem 1, which is in direct contradiction to the conclusion of Fitch’s
paradox. This means that we certainly should not accept 2 as our solution of Fitch’s paradox.
Therefore, if we accept the deduction, then obviously that omits 3 as an option, and leaves us with
option 1.
There are reasons for preferring 3. If we continue to stick with the theme of
“representability in arithmetic,” we must reject alethic modal operators, since necessity cannot be
represented in arithmetic, and possibility is defined in terms of necessity. The reason necessity
cannot be represented in arithmetic is simple: (∀𝑝)(𝑝 ↔ □𝑝) is consistent in modal logic (it
restricts the frame to a single reflexive world), but (∀𝜙)(𝜙 ↔ 𝐿 (⌜𝜙⌝)) (where 𝐿 is the
representation of □) is inconsistent due to Tarski’s indefinability theorem, since 𝐿 would then just
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contain the theorems of arithmetic. So, there is no general representation of □ as a predicate in
arithmetic. Therefore, since the K Principle can’t even be represented, the deduction is bogus.
A solution is to simply use quantified modal logic as the basis for arithmetic and use raw
modal operators instead of representing them in arithmetic. However, Quine has famously argued
against QML due to certain ontological obligations it brings with it (Quine 1947). While these
arguments aren’t as problematic as they once were (Marcus 1995), they are still worth considering.
If, despite this, one uses quantified modal logic as the basis for arithmetic and decides to represent
knowledge in arithmetic, then I see no reason why they would accept any other conclusion other
than the falsity of the K Principle in this application.
Strengthening Theorem 1 with Natural Language
At this point, I would like to expand into more general forms of epistemology—using
Gödel blindspots to reject the K Principle in applications other than representability in
mathematics. First, it’s worth mentioning structuralism, the notion that the universe is a structure
in mathematics. Under some interpretations of structuralism, knowledge would then be a structure
in mathematics, which could then fall victim to theorem 1. However, structuralism is very broad
and ununified (Schmidt and Heinz-Juergen 2019), in addition to the fact that I’m not well read
enough on structuralism to make definitive judgements about the position, so it’s not possible to
make a generalizing statement such as “A structuralist should believe the result from theorem 1
and apply it to general epistemology.” What we can, do, however, is identify the natural language
equivalent to the Gödel-like sentence, the 𝜙 such that 𝜙 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤(⌜𝜙⌝).
This natural language equivalent is simply how this Gödel-like sentence is read: “I am not
known.” The difficulty in establishing theorem 1 was a proof that such a sentence existed in
arithmetic, but we know such a sentence exists in natural language because we can state it in its
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entirety—it exists on the paper. We can formalize the sentence in modal form in the same manner
that we’ve been doing throughout the paper:
𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑝
Through the same basic proof give to establish theorem 1, we can establish:
𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝
Which, then, existentially generalizing to avoid assigning 𝑝:
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝)
Conjecture Ka

This demonstrates the existence of epistemic blindspots, but this time without the restriction that
discussion be limited to representable predicates in arithmetic, and that 𝑝 be an arithmetic sentence.
We simply used theorem 1 as an inspiration to find such a sentence in natural language.
Strengthening Further
Is it possible to obtain a general blindspot using this procedure? To come up with a selfreferential sentence that is necessarily not known (or equivalently, not possible to know)? Such a
sentence should look along the lines of the 𝑝 such that:
□(𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑝 )
From here, we can do a line-by-line deduction to demonstrate conjecture Kb:
{1}
{2}
{3}
{3}

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(∃𝑝)□(𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑝)
□(𝑞 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑞 )
𝑞 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑞
𝑞 & ¬𝐾𝑞

{}
{}
{}
{2}
{2}

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

(𝑞 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑞 ) → (𝑞 & ¬𝐾𝑞 )
□((𝑞 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑞 ) → (𝑞 & ¬𝐾𝑞 ))
□(𝑞 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑞 ) → □(𝑞 & ¬𝐾𝑞 )
□(𝑞 & ¬𝐾𝑞 )
□𝑞 & □¬𝐾𝑞

Premise
Premise for 𝐸𝑆
Premise
Proof technique used in
theorem 1
2, 3, Conditionalization
4, Necessitation
5, Distribution
2, 6, Modus ponens
7, Distribution over conjunction
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{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{2}
{1}

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

□𝑞
𝑞
□¬𝐾𝑞
¬◇𝐾𝑞
𝑞 & ¬◇𝐾𝑞
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝)
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝)

9, Conjunctive simplification
10, Axiom 𝑀
9, Conjunctive simplification
12, Modal equivalence
11, 13, Conjunctive addition
14, Existential generalization
1, 2, 15, 𝐸𝑆 procedure

So there exists a 𝑝 that is a traditional blindspot, true and not possible to know. The reason Gödel
blindspots are merely not known instead of not possible to know is because there is no way to
guarantee that 𝑝 has the same truth value in each possible world. That would require necessitating
inside the existential quantifier in theorem 1, which is not possible, as Plantinga states (Plantinga
1974). For theorem 1, we prove that some blindspot necessarily exists in every possible world, but
not that a sentence exists such that it’s not known in any possible world. However, we can do such
an action here, because instead we know that there exists a sentence that says “Necessarily, I am
not known.”
It’s worth noting that we make use of axiom 𝑀 in the deduction, that □𝑝 → 𝑝. We haven’t
made use of this axiom in the past (we’ve just been making use of the modal system 𝐾), but most
philosophers think that 𝑀 is true, since what is necessary should also be what’s true (Garson 2013).
Factive Predicates, Fitch’s Paradox Revisited, and Anti-Realism
“Knowledge” is a very strong word. However, in all of our demonstrations, the only feature
of knowledge we ever actually used was factivity. In this case, what separates “knowledge” from
“true belief?” In fact, all of our demonstrations apply just as well for true belief. In this case, we
not only have epistemic blindspots that are true but not possible to know, but we, in fact, have
epistemic blindspots that are true and are not possible to have true belief in! In fact, the same
argument applies for any other factive predicate, such as “demonstrability,” assuming you can
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demonstrate something only if it’s true. Then, we have sentences like “Necessarily, I am not
demonstrated,” which are true but not possible to demonstrate.
At this point, we have a good place to re-enter our discussion about Fitch’s paradox.
Previously, we could only object to Fitch’s paradox on the basis of rejecting the K Principle by
virtue of a modus tollens argument, and only when we consider knowledge as a predicate
represented in arithmetic. Now, we have the tools to reject the K Principle directly with conjecture
Kb, and without the representability restriction on the knowledge operator. Recall that the K
principle states that:
(∀𝑝)(𝑝 → ◇𝐾𝑝)
And that conjecture Kb states that:
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝)
Which are contradictory. Since conjecture Kb was proven using an instantiation of a sentence
about natural language (the sentence “Necessarily, I am not known”), we have a good basis to
reject the K principle on natural language arguments alone.
Furthermore, we can reject other assertions with the form (∀𝑝)(𝑝 → ◇𝐹𝑝) where 𝐹 is any
factive modal operator. We can reject the assertion that “all truths are demonstrable,” that “all
truths are able to be the contents of true belief,” and similar assertions involving all other factive
predicates, since we have given good evidence to support the more general statement (where (∀𝐹 )
quantifies over the strong modal operator associated with all accessibility relations):
(∀𝐹 )(∀𝑝)((𝐹𝑝 → 𝑝) → (∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬◇𝐹𝑝))
By creating a sentence 𝑝 such that, for some 𝐹:
□(𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐹𝑝)
And existentially quantifying into the box, to yield:
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(∃𝑝)□(𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐹𝑝)
Which then gives support for conjecture Kb, with the sentence 𝑝 being logically equivalent to the
sentence “necessarily, I am not 𝐹” for any factive predicate 𝐹.
Even though we reject the K Principle, this is not a strong enough argument to reject antirealism (the position that truth is epistemic) entirely. As Hand suggests, anti-realism doesn’t
necessarily imply the K principle (Hand 2003). However, even Hand admits:
“In extraordinary cases, where interference is produced by attempts to perform verification
procedures for propositions about the performance of verification procedures, truth can
hide. [emphasis added] [… T]he antirealist has no difficulty in attributing an understanding
of 𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝, a grasp of what the truth of 𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 consists in. It is precisely in virtue of
this understanding that a competent user can see immediately that if 𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝 is true, there
is no way to verify it. Now, everything just said is available to the antirealist, so the
antirealist can give an account of the knowability paradox on which the truth of 𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝
cannot be discovered.
This seems to suggest the existence of epistemic blindspots (though he does not use this term), but
that these blindspots must be explicitly crafted and are not “naturally occurring,” so to speak. One
instance is 𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝, but another could possibly be the 𝑝 such that □(𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑝). Because the
antirealist understands what it means for that sentence to be true, the antirealist can give an account
of these blindspots. However, their truth cannot be discovered, because such truths can hide due
to “interference.”
So, while I don’t make an argument against anti-realism as a whole, I do make an argument
against the K principle. The K Principle directly contradicts the existence of blindspots like
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“Necessarily, I am not known,” a blindspot inspired by the sentence proven by the diagonal lemma:
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤 (⌜𝑝⌝)), of which an instantiation of 𝑝 would be a blindspot.
Some Notes on Symbolizations of Self-Referential Propositions
This entire chapter, I have been under the assumption that “Necessarily, I am 𝑃” for some
modality 𝑃 can be symbolized as: the 𝑝 such that □(𝑝 ↔ 𝑃𝑝). However, this could also be
symbolized in other, more bizarre ways, depending on whether or not the word “necessarily” is
taken to belong to the part of the sentence contained in the self-reference. This is made clearer by
asking the question: when we say “I” in a sentence, what do we refer to? In this case, is the word
“necessarily” included in the scope of the word “I?” If so, then we would symbolize it differently
than I have been in this essay. We can force a symbolization of □(𝑝 ↔ 𝑃𝑝) by saying: the sentence
𝑝 = "I am 𝑃" holds in every possible world. Working the necessary modality into the sentence
itself is tricky, because it might be encapsulated by the self-reference.
I stand by the interpretation that the word “necessarily” is not contained by the word “I,”
but there is a strong case to be made against this. I will not be making an argument for my position
in this paper, though, because that is getting out of the scope of what this essay is. I believe it is
worth mentioning, however.
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Conclusion
I have proven that, when knowledge is represented in arithmetic, there exist self-referential
blindspots. These blindspots are called Gödel blindspots, and are not quite a subset of traditional
blindspots, but I call them blindspots due to the fact that they must exist. Gödel blindspots become
Gödel blindspots by virtue of being unknowable due to the diagonal lemma. Such self-referential
blindspots may be read in natural language as “I am not known.” By virtue of us being able to say
that sentence in natural language, I conjecture that self-referential blindspots exist through natural
language, if one strengthens the sentence to say, “Necessarily, I am not known.” I conjecture this
because I have not given a strong defense of this position aside from “we can say such a sentence.”
Obviously, an argument can be made against the sentence from a position of absurdity or
nonsensicalness.
One can derive from the sentence “Necessarily, I am not known,” the following:
(∃𝑝)(𝑝 & ¬◇𝐾𝑝 ), which is in direct contradiction to the K Principle, (∀𝑝)(𝑝 → ◇𝐾𝑝), used to
derive epistemic trivialism in Fitch’s paradox of knowability. Such blindspots also exist for any
other factive predicate, such as true belief (“Necessarily, I am not the contents of true belief” is
impossible to be the contents of true belief) and demonstrability (“Necessarily, I am not
demonstrated” is impossible to be demonstrated). This goes to reject any other K Principle
analogue with the form (∀𝑝)(𝐹𝑝 → 𝑝) & (∀𝑝)(𝑝 → ◇𝐹𝑝) where 𝐹 is some modal operator.
This paper did not inspect constructivist responses to self-referential blindspots, not did it
analyze anti-realism specifically instead of merely investigating the K Principle. These endeavors
are left to a future work. However, I feel strongly about rejecting the K principle in classical logic,
since I have provided yet another example of an epistemic blindspot in addition to the well-known
𝑝 & ¬𝐾𝑝, that being the 𝑝 such that □(𝑝 ↔ ¬𝐾𝑝). There are many other types of examples, but I
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believe self-referential blindspots are especially interesting, since they deny their own knowability.
Self-referential blindspots are unlikely to greatly impact day-to-day life, unlike perhaps some of
the blindspots mentioned in Sorensen’s book. However, I believe this has been sufficiently
interesting to warrant a study.

